

16 August 2006

# Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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- Arab mujahidin took courses in explosives, electronics, and document falsification in private residences in Kabul where instructors charged fees of between \$50 and \$100 per month.
- A Moroccan guesthouse in Kabul provided target reconnaissance training primarily to Moroccans.
- One trainee received informal training on the placement, extraction, and camouflage of antitank and antipersonnel mines while on the frontlines in Bagram. (b)(3) NatSecAct

The degree of al-Qa'ida involvement in the Afghanistan training scene during the 1990s is often overstated. Al-Qa'ida had only a peripheral role in training during the middle part of the decade when Bin Ladin and most of his group were located in Sudan. From 1993 to 1997, al-Faruq was used to train Tajiks with only a few al-Qa'ida members assisting. Al-Qa'ida reportedly was "in control of al-Faruq" again in 1997.

- Some of the camps have been misidentified as being run by al-Qa'ida, including Khaldan and Abu Khabab al-Masri's poisons-related facilities at Derunta and Kargha.
- Recent reporting suggests that the degree to which al-Qa'ida financed non-al-Qa'ida camps may have been exaggerated. For example, a senior al-Qa'ida leader reportedly said that he did not know of al-Qa'ida providing any money, material, or trainers to non-al-Qa'ida camps. (b)(3) NatSecAct

By the late 1990s, al-Qa'ida—with the assistance of the Taliban—sought to gain hegemony over training in Afghanistan, but the group never controlled all the camps.

#### Khaldan Not Affiliated With Al-Qa'ida (b)(3) NatSecAct

A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by al-Qa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a "senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant," which led to the

inference that the Khaldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama Bin Ladin.

- The group's flagship camp, al-Faruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so that Bin Ladin's new organization could have a training infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab al-Khidamat, the nongovernmental organization that supported Khaldan.
- Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and that Khaldan was not overseen by Bin Ladin's organization.
- There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps and Khaldan. Trainees, particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Khaldan were referred to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'ida training. The two groups, however, did not exchange trainers.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- An al-Qa'ida facilitator reportedly said that in 1998 Bin Ladin began to pressure other Arabs to close their facilities because he wanted all the recruits sent to al-Qa'ida.
- Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi initially foiled attempts to shut down Khaldan, but by April 2000 the camp had closed.
- The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri were able to bribe or convince Taliban officials to allow them to continue operating their camps despite al-Qa'ida's pressure on the Taliban to close them. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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532-2

Date:

TO: HQSDISSEM

FROM:

SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTS BY AMMAR AL-BALUCHI ON SAYFULLAH PARACHA AND UZHAYR PARACHA

----- BODY -----

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TOT: 181929Z JUN 03

DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

INTEL 181929Z DIRECTOR (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: HQSDISSEM.

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOR: 301600Z MAY 03

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CITE 39238

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TO:

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CIA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

DIST: 18 JUNE 2003

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJ: CT: COMMENTS BY AMMAR AL-BALUCHI ON SAYFULLAH PARACHA  
AND UZHAYR PARACHA



DOI: DECEMBER 2002 - FEBRUARY 2003

SOURCE: A DETAINEE. (A DETAINEE)

SUMMARY: NONE (b)(3) CIAAct

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM DETAINEE ALI 'ABD AL-((AZIZ)) ALI, AKA ((AMMAR AL-BALUCHI)), MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM. AMMAR ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLDING INFORMATION AND EMPLOYING COUNTERINTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.)

2. DURING CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN LATE MAY 2003, AMMAR DISCUSSED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SAYFULLAH ((PARACHA)), AKA SAYF AL-RAHMAN ((PARACHA)), AND HIS SON UZHAYR ((PARACHA)). AMMAR STATED THAT SAYFULLAH CONTINUED TO MEET WITH HIM AS A FRIEND AND POTENTIAL BUSINESS PARTNER EVEN AFTER THE CAPTURE OF KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)), AKA ((MUKHTAR)). AMMAR STATED, HOWEVER, THAT SAYFULLAH DID NOT KNOW OF MUKHTAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION UNTIL THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY OF HIS ARREST. AMMAR COMMENTED THAT AT THAT POINT, SAYFULLAH PROBABLY KNEW AMMAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION AS WELL. AMMAR INSISTED THAT THERE WERE NO OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SAYFULLAH. AMMAR ADDED THAT SAYFULLAH WAS UNWITTINGLY BEING USED TO ASSIST IN HIS BROADER PLANS WITH AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE ((MAJID KHAN)), WHICH REQUIRED A BUSINESS BE SET UP IN PAKISTAN TO DO BUSINESS WITH MAJID'S COMPANY IN THE UNITED STATES. AMMAR CLAIMED HE USED HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH SAYFULLAH TO IDENTIFY THE PAKISTANI RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING HIS OWN BUSINESS, OR TO USE SAYFULLAH'S BUSINESS ITSELF AS THE CONDUIT TO MAJID. AMMAR DENIED KNOWING IF MUKHTAR EVER TASKED SAYFULLAH TO CONDUCT ANY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

3. AMMAR CLAIMED HE MET WITH UZHAYR A TOTAL OF FOUR TIMES, EACH TIME WHILE VISITING SAYFULLAH AT SAYFULLAH'S HOUSE. AMMAR STATED THAT UZHAYR WAS TOTALLY UNWITTING OF AMMAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION AND OF AMMAR'S INTENTION TO USE SAYFULLAH FOR BROADER OPERATIONAL PLANS INVOLVING MAJID KHAN. AMMAR STATED THAT IN APPROXIMATELY JANUARY 2003, HE REQUESTED SAYFULLAH HAVE UZHAYR INQUIRE ABOUT MAJID'S IMMIGRATION STATUS WHILE ON AN UPCOMING TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. THE THIRD TIME AMMAR MET UZHAYR AT THE PARACHA RESIDENCE WAS IN ABOUT LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 2003. MAJID WAS WITH HIM AND WAS INTRODUCED TO UZHAYR. MAJID EXPLAINED TO UZHAYR HOW TO INQUIRE INTO MAJID'S STATUS WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES. AMMAR AND MAJID MET WITH UZHAYR ONE ADDITIONAL TIME AT AN ICE CREAM PARLOR IN KARACHI, WHERE MAJID GAVE UZHAYR THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND NECESSARY INFORMATION REQUIRED TO LOOK INTO HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS. AMMAR STATED NEITHER HE NOR MAJID INDICATED TO UZHAYR AT ANY TIME THAT THEY WERE MUJAHIDIN OR AL-QA'IDA. AMMAR STATED THAT UZHAYR DID NOT COMPLETE THE TASK.

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Date: 20030530

532-4

TO: DIRECTOR, ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

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CITE 39239

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ALEC INFO

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR: (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT:

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

REF:

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE; FYI.

2. REF INFO WAS OBTAINED ON 25 AND 26 MAY 2003, DURING  
INTERROGATIONS OF AL-QA'IDA DETAINEE ALI 'ABD AL-((AZIZ)) ALI, AKA  
AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)), (b)(1)

3.

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END OF MESSAGE

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542

Date: (b)(1)  
 TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONCERNS OVER RECENT KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD THREAT REVELATIONS

----- BODY -----

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TOT: 022012Z MAY 03

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STAFF

022012Z ALEC (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE (b)(1) NFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(1)  
 (b)(3) CIAAct  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONCERNS OVER RECENT KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD THREAT REVELATIONS

REF: (b)(1)  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: --PLEASE SEE PARA FIVE REQUEST FOR INTERROGATION TEAM FEEDBACK REGARDING INTERROGATION STRATEGY FOR KSM.

2. HQS/ALEC GREATLY APPRECIATES BASE'S RECENT ACQUISITION OF REF THREAT INFORMATION REGARDING PLANNED ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN FROM KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) AKA ((MUKHTAR)). WE AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S CONFRONTATIONAL SESSION

WITH KSM, THAT INCLUDED SHOWING THE CAPTURE PHOTOS OF AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND WALID MUHAMMAD ((BIN ATTASH)) ON 29 APRIL WAS A KEY MOTIVATOR IN KSM'S DECISION TO PROVIDE REF INFORMATION. THAT SAID, KSM'S PROVISION OF SUCH INFORMATION -- ONLY AFTER HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE WHICH LED HIM TO ASSUME THE OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN WERE COMPROMISED -- IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN AND MUST BE ADDRESSED SOONEST.

3. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT KSM ONLY MADE THESE NEW ADMISSIONS OF PLANNED ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN AFTER SEEING THE CAPTURE PHOTOGRAPHS OF 'AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND KHALLAD. WE CONSIDER KSM'S LONG-STANDING OMISSION OF REF INFORMATION TO BE A SERIOUS CONCERN, ESPECIALLY AS THIS OMISSION MAY WELL HAVE COST AMERICAN LIVES HAD PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES NOT BEEN DILIGENT IN FOLLOWING UP ON UNRELATED CRIMINAL LEADS THAT LED TO THE CAPTURE OF AMMAR, BIN ATTASH, AND OTHER PROBABLE OPERATIVES INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK PLANS. MOREOVER, DEBRIEFERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RAISED THE IDEA OF ATTACKS INSIDE PAKISTAN, BUT KSM EXPRESSLY TOLD   ALEC THAT OPERATIONS INSIDE PAKISTAN WERE NOT ON THE TABLE. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE FACT THAT THIS HANDS OFF APPROACH DID NOT SQUARE WITH HIS STORY ON THE "PERFUME LETTER" PLOT TO ATTACK HOTELS IN PAKISTAN, KSM LAMELY COUNTERED THAT THESE HOTELS WERE AN EXCEPTION AS US "MILITARY" PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO RESIDE THERE. SIMPLY PUT, KSM HAS HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO COME CLEAN ON THIS THREAT AND, FROM OUR OPTIC, HE DELIBERATELY WITHHELD THE INFORMATION UNTIL HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE THAT WE ALREADY KNEW ABOUT IT, OR SOON WOULD KNOW ABOUT IT FROM AMMAR AND KHALLAD. THERE COULD BE OTHER SUCH INFORMATION.

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4. SINCE KSM'S CAPTURE, THE SOLE FOCUS OF OUR INTERROGATION EFFORT HAS BEEN THE ACQUISITION OF DETAILED THREAT INFORMATION -- WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO DISRUPT FUTURE AL-QA'IDA ATTACKS. YET, DESPITE REPEATED AND NUMEROUS OFFERED OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVIDE SUCH THREAT INFORMATION, KSM HAS SHOWN A PERSISTENT PATTERN OF GIVING UP THIS INFORMATION ONLY WHEN HE ASSESSES WE ALREADY KNOW IT AND HE FEELS HE IS BACKED INTO A CORNER.

--KSM'S PROVISION OF THE PAKISTAN THREAT REPORTING - ONLY AFTER HE WAS MADE AWARE OF THE CAPTURE OF THE ATTACK PLANNERS - IS VIEWED AS A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION OF CONTINUED AND DELIBERATE WITHHOLDING OF THREAT INFORMATION WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPROMISED.

--WE ALSO POINT TO KSM'S REPEATED DISSEMBLING ABOUT JAFFAR ((AL-TAYYAR))'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PADILLA PLOT, WHICH HE ADMITTED WAS A LIE BUT ONLY AFTER WE CONFRONTED HIM WITH BINYAM'S VERSION OF THE STORY.

--SIMILARLY, WE NOTE THAT WHEN DISCUSSING AL-QA'IDA'S PLANS FOR FOLLOW-ON ATTACKS INSIDE THE US, KSM CONVENIENTLY "FORGOT" ALL ABOUT HAMABLI OPERATIVE ARSHAD, WHO SAYS THAT HE WAS TASKED TO

CRASH A PLANE INTO THE TALLEST BUILDING IN CALIFORNIA. OF NOTE, DEBRIEFERS OBSERVED THAT KSM WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LINE OF QUESTIONING AND SEEMED ONLY TO RELAX AND "REMEMBER" THE DETAILS WHEN HE HEARD THAT ARSHAD HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

5. THIS PERSISTENT PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR FURTHER UNDERSCORES OUR ASSESSMENT THAT KSM HAS DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER PLANNED ATTACKS WHICH HE HAS YET TO REVEAL. OF CONCERN, ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT PLANS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE U.S., SAUDI ARABIA, AND EAST AFRICA ARE PROGRESSING AND MAY BE IMMINENT. WE ASSESS KSM IS MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE REGARDING THESE ATTACKS AND THE LIKELY TARGETS THAN HE HAS ADMITTED TO DATE. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE REQUEST BASE'S THOUGHTS ON HOW BEST TO ADAPT THE KSM INTERROGATION STRATEGY TO INCREASE OUR CHANCES OF ACQUIRING THIS CRITICAL AND TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR COMMENTS. MANY THANKS.

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DIRECTOR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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STAFF

171410Z DIRECTOR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

FROM:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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SUBJECT: APPROVAL TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN TALIBAN AND AL-QA'IDA  
 PERSONNEL

REF:

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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 (b)(3) CIAAct  
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 NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE BELOW.

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 (b)(3) CIAAct  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. RELEASE OF THIS CABLE CONSTITUTES BLANKET DDO APPROVAL  
 FOR PERSONNEL TO CAPTURE AND  
 DETAIN TALIBAN AND AL-QA'IDA PERSONNEL, OR OTHERS WHO POSE  
 CONTINUING, SERIOUS THREATS OF VIOLENCE OR DEATH TO U.S. PERSONS  
 AND INTERESTS AND/OR ARE PLANNING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

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 (b)(3) CIAAct  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

3. REF A PARA 3 REPORTS, INTER ALIA, THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS  
 AUTHORIZED "CIA (TO) CAPTURE  
 AND DETAIN PERSONS WHO POSE CONTINUING, SERIOUS THREATS OF  
 VIOLENCE OR DEATH TO U.S. PERSONS AND INTERESTS OR WHO ARE  
 PLANNING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES." THE DCI HAS DIRECTED THAT THE  
 DECISION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY MUST BE MADE EITHER BY  
 CHIEF/CTC OR  
 BY THE DDO

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 (b)(3) NatSecAct  
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-- REF A PARA 3 ALSO PROVIDES THAT "WHERE FEASIBLE, APPROVAL  
 BY THE (NSC) PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE WILL BE SOUGHT

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ACCORDINGLY,  
 CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED ABOVE, IT

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IS APPROPRIATE TO GIVE BLANKET APPROVAL FOR CAPTURE AND DETAIN  
 OPERATIONS TARGETED AT INDIVIDUALS WHO   
 POSE THE REQUISITE "CONTINUING SERIOUS THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR DEATH  
 TO US PERSONS AND INTERESTS OR WHO ARE PLANNING TERRORIST  
 ACTIVITIES."

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7. PLEASE CONFIRM IN FUTURE CABLE TRAFFIC FOR THE RECORD  
 WHEN YOU EXERCISE THIS AUTHORITY, WITH ACTION TO CTC, ☐ AND INFO  
 TO CTC/LGL.

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~~DIRECTOR~~

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STAFF

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

FROM:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON SCOPE OF CAPTURE AND DETENTION AUTHORITIES

REF: ~~DIRECTOR~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE GUIDANCE BELOW.

2. IN LIGHT OF RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE FIELD RELATED TO

AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT CAPTURE AND DETAIN OPERATIONS  
 AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS PURSUANT TO THE 17 SEPTEMBER 2001 CT  
 MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION, THIS CABLE REVIEWS THE SCOPE OF THAT  
 AUTHORITY AND THE STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO SUCH OPERATIONS.  
 PURSUANT TO THE MON, [ ] IS AUTHORIZED TO UNDERTAKE CAPTURE/DETAIN  
 OPERATIONS ONLY AGAINST THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE ACTIONS POSE A  
 "CONTINUING, SERIOUS THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR DEATH TO U.S. PERSONS  
 AND INTERESTS OR WHO ARE PLANNING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES." AS A  
 RESULT, THERE MUST BE AN ARTICULABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO CONCLUDE  
 THAT THE ACTIONS OF A SPECIFIC PERSON WHOM WE PROPOSE TO CAPTURE  
 AND/OR DETAIN POSE A "CONTINUING SERIOUS THREAT" OF VIOLENCE OR  
 DEATH TO U.S. PERSONS OR INTERESTS OR THAT THE PERSON IS PLANNING  
 A TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

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3. THE "CONTINUING, SERIOUS THREAT" STANDARD REQUIRES THAT WE  
 POSSESS RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE THAT IDENTIFIES THE REASONS WE  
 CONCLUDE THAT THE PERSON POSES THE REQUISITE THREAT. FOR EXAMPLE,  
 ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD SATISFY THE STANDARD INCLUDE -- BUT ARE NOT  
 LIMITED TO -- INTELLIGENCE INDICATING THAT:

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 (b)(3) NatSecAct

5. FYI: THE NATURE OF OUR CAPTURE AND DETAIN AUTHORITIES UNDER THE CT MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION IS UNPRECEDENTED, BUT EVEN SO, THE AUTHORITY IS NOT WITHOUT LIMITS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE NOT PERMITTED TO DETAIN SOMEONE MERELY UPON A SUSPICION THAT HE OR SHE HAS VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORISTS OR PLANNED ACTS OF TERRORISM; RATHER, WE MUST BE ABLE TO MAKE THE INTELLIGENCE CASE THAT HE OR SHE IN FACT DOES HAVE SUCH INFORMATION AND IS DELIBERATELY WITHHOLDING IT FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

-- SIMILARLY, THE MERE MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR GROUP, OR THE MERE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR FAMILIAL TIE, DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONNOTE THAT THE THRESHOLD OF "CONTINUING, SERIOUS THREAT" HAS BEEN SATISFIED. RATHER, TO MEET THAT THRESHOLD THERE MUST BE AN ARTICULABLE INTELLIGENCE CASE THAT THAT SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL POSES A THREAT.

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7. PLEASE NOTE, REF PROVIDED BLANKET APPROVAL WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL FOR CAPTURE AND DETAIN OPERATIONS TARGETED AT INDIVIDUALS WHO [REDACTED] POSE THE REQUISITE "CONTINUING SERIOUS THREAT" OF VIOLENCE/DEATH. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AT THIS STAGE IN THE WAR BELIEVE THERE IS SUFFICIENT  
OPPORTUNITY IN ADVANCE TO DOCUMENT THE KEY ASPECTS OF MANY. IF NOT  
MOST, OF OUR CAPTURE AND DETAIN OPERATIONS. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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OCT 8 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: George J. Tenet  
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U) Delegations of Authorities  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. (TS/ (b)(1) Summary. By this memorandum I delegate to the Director of Operations (DDO) and to the Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC) certain specific authorities provided in (b)(1) the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification ("MoN") (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. (TS/ (b)(1) Background. Paragraph 4 of the MoN provides that: (b)(3) NatSecAct

The DCI acting through the CIA may undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities. (b)(1)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (U) Delegations of Authority

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4. ~~(TS)~~ [ ] Discussion. The NSC Lawyers Group discussed at some length the prospective chains of command for the approval of capture and detention operations under Paragraph 1 of the MoN, [ ]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct [ ] It was agreed that I would establish a process within CIA by which such operations would be reviewed and approved. Pursuant to those discussions, I have approved the following procedures by which candidates [ ] will be identified, reviewed, and presented to the DDO and/or D/CTC for review.

5. ~~(TS)~~ [ ] All proposals for specific operations under [ ] the MoN shall set forth in writing the reasons for the determination that the individual targeted meets the criteria [ ] shall be

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~/

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (U) Delegations of Authority

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

coordinated with legal counsel, and shall be approved or disapproved in writing. In exigent circumstances, these approvals may be granted orally, but shall be reduced to writing in no more than 48 hours in the case of Paragraph 4 operations,

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

6. ~~(TS)~~/ In order to permit the rapid consideration and approval, or disapproval, of proposed operations I make the following formal delegations of authority.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

A. Hostile capture and detention operations: In those situations where time does not permit prior approval by the Principals, I delegate to the DDO authority to approve capture and detention operations (including rendition operations) authorized by Paragraph 4

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

B. Consented capture and detention operations: Through the DDO, I delegate to D/CTC authority to approve capture, detention, or rendition operations authorized by Paragraph 4

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)


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(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (U) Delegations of Authority

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

  
George U. Tenet

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct



Date: 20040226

1677-2

TO: (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: NON-RECOGNITION OF ABU YUSIF CANDIDATE, (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- (b)(1) -----  
~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

STAFF

262236Z ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: PRIORITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT: NON-RECOGNITION OF ABU YUSIF CANDIDATE,

(b)(3) NatSecAct

REF:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

TEXT:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. ACTION REQUIRED:

2. AS FOLLOW-UP TO REFS A AND B REQUESTS FOR DETAINEE

IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE ((ABU YUSIF AL-JAMA'IKI))

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. DETAINEE COMMENTS [REDACTED] AS POSSIBLE MATCH FOR  
HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVE ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI:

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

-- ON 11 FEBRUARY 2004, KHALID SHAYKH ((MOHAMMED))  
AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)) AND KHALLAD ((BIN ATTASH)) WERE SHOWN  
[REDACTED] PHOTO OF ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NONE RECOGNIZED THE PHOTO OR HAD ANY  
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO ADD.

-- OF INTEREST, HOWEVER, HASSAN GHUL BELIEVED THAT HE  
HAD SEEN THIS MAN BEFORE, BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHERE.  
ON A SEPARATE, BUT RELATED NOTE, GHUL ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE  
(GHUL) THINKS HE MAY HAVE FACILITATED THE TRAVEL OF AN ABU YUSIF  
FROM THE UK BEFORE 9/11 TO KARACHI FOR ONWARD TRAVEL TO  
AFGHANISTAN FOR TRAINING. GHUL WAS NOT SURE HOWEVER, [REDACTED]  
WAS INDEED THE MAN HE FACILITATED, BUT SAID HE COULD NOT RULE IT  
OUT. GHUL ALSO SAID THE MAN (ABU YUSIF) HE IS THINKING OF WAS A  
BLACK MAN SENT TO HIM FROM THE UK [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED]  
FINALLY, GHUL SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE MAN HE FACILITATED  
TRAVEL FOR WAS NAMED YUSIF, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD  
POSSIBILITY. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

-- AS MENTIONED ABOVE, HASSAN GHUL BELIEVED HE HAD SEEN THIS MAN BEFORE, BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE FROM WHERE. ON A SEPARATE, BUT RELATED NOTE, GHUL COMMENTED THAT HE (GHUL) THINKS HE MAY HAVE FACILITATED THE TRAVEL OF AN ABU YUSIF FROM THE UK BEFORE 9/11 TO KARACHI FOR ONWARD TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN FOR TRAINING. GHUL WAS NOT SURE [REDACTED] WAS INDEED THE MAN HE FACILITATED, BUT SAID HE COULD NOT RULE IT OUT. GHUL ALSO SAID THE MAN (ABU YUSIF) HE IS THINKING OF WAS A BLACK MAN SENT TO HIM FROM THE UK [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] FINALLY, GHUL SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE MAN HE FACILITATED TRAVEL FOR WAS NAMED YUSIF, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1690

Date:

(b)(1)  
 TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWI ON HEATHROW  
 PLOT OPERATIVES

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOT: 161821Z JUL 03

ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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161821Z

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND MUSTAFA  
 AL-HAWSAWI ON HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES

REF: (b)(1)  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: --PLEASE USE PARA 5 TEARLINE SUGGESTED  
 REQUIREMENTS FOR AMMAR AND PARA 6 TEARLINE SUGGESTED REQUIREMENTS  
 FOR HAWSAWI.

2. HQS/ALEC WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ADDEES ATTENTION TO  
 INFORMATION THAT MAY NOT HAVE  
 BEEN ADDRESSED WITH AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)) OR MUSTAFA AHMAD

(b)(1)  
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 CIAAct  
 (b)(3)  
 NatSecAct

AL-((HAWSAWI)) REGARDING ONE ((ADIL AHMED)) VARIANT ((ADIL AHMAD)), AN EMPLOYEE AT HEATHROW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, WHOSE NAME IS SIMILAR TO ((ABU ADIL)), ONE OF THE OPERATIVES IN THIS PLOT. AS STATION IS FULLY AWARE, HQS/ALEC REMAINS CONCERNED WITH WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE PALTRY INFORMATION COMING FROM DETAINEES ABOUT OPERATIONS IN THE U.K., THE EVER CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF THE KHUBAYB GROUP, AND THE ORIGINAL HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES (ABU ADIL, ((ABU YUSEF)), ((AYYUB)), AND ((AZMARAI))).

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ALTHOUGH THE ADIL AHMED WORKING AT HEATHROW MAY OR MAY NOT BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ABU ADIL OF THE HEATHROW PLOT, HQS/ALEC BELIEVES THIS IS ONE LEAD WORTH FOLLOWING UP ON WITH DETAINEES. GIVEN THE ACCESS OF AMMAR AND HAWSAWI TO U.K. BASED OPERATIVES, WE BELIEVE DETAINEES COULD SHED LIGHT ON THIS AND OTHER U.K. BASED OPERATIVES.

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ADIL AHMED WORKS AT HEATHROW AIRPORT AT AN UNSPECIFIED BAGGAGE HANDLING COMPANY. FURTHER, ADIL RECENTLY VISITED PAKISTAN, ADIL AHMED IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN PERIPHERALLY INVOLVED IN THE TOOTING GROUP (FORMER NAME OF THE ABU KHUBAYB GROUP).

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3. IN ADDITION, SINCE AMMAR TOOK OVER OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR KSM AFTER HIS ARREST, WE BELIEVE THAT HE MAY VERY LIKELY HAVE MORE TO TELL. FOR EXAMPLE, DID ABU ADIL AND ABU YUSIF OBTAIN THEIR PILOTS LICENSES OR WERE AYUB AND AZMARAI SENT IN THEIR STEAD, PER KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD))'S RECOMMENDATION. FOR MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWI, WE WONDER WHAT HIS CONNECTIONS ARE TO HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES ABU ADIL AND ABU YUSIF, AYUB AND AZMARAI AND POSSIBLY ABU KHUBAYB GROUP MEMBERS. DESPITE HIS CLAIMS DURING HIS 24 MARCH DEBRIEFING THAT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF UK PLOTS OR INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK NAMED ABU ADIL OR ABU YOUSEF, WE ARE HARD PRESSED TO BELIEVE THAT GIVEN HAWSAWI'S FINANCIAL ROLE IN AL-QA'IDA AND FURTHER KSM'S TRUST, HE WOULD BE "LEFT OUT" OF THIS OPERATION.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

AS SUCH, WE WONDER IF HAWSAWI IS PRESSED ON THIS POINT WHAT POSSIBLE NEW LEADS ON ABU ADIL OR THE OTHER OPERATIVES IN THIS PLOT COULD BE DERIVED FROM HAWSAWI, ESPECIALLY SINCE KSM MENTIONED THAT HE (HAWSAWI) WOULD AT LEAST KNOW ABU ADIL'S EMAIL ADDRESS. FURTHER, AS OTHER DETAINEES HAVE POINTED OUT, HAWSAWI PROVIDED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (AIR, HOTEL, AND CAR RENTALS) TO SOME OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER HIJACKERS, WE WONDER IF HE ALSO PROVIDED THIS TYPE OF SUPPORT FOR THE HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES.

#### 4. DETAINEE INFORMATION ON HAWSAWI FOR BASE BACKGROUND:

--ACCORDING TO ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)), HAWSAWI IS A WELL RESPECTED MAN AND A MEMBER OF AL-QA'IDA'S MEDIA COMMITTEE ALONG WITH KSM.

ABU ZUBAYDAH FIRST SAW HIM SOME TIME AFTER THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE (AFTER 12 OCTOBER 2000) WORKING ON A COMPUTER IN AL-QA'IDA'S MEDIA COMMITTEE. FURTHER ABU ZUBAYDAH POINTS OUT THAT HAWSAWI IS VERY GOOD FRIENDS WITH KSM. HAWSAWI IS ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT COMPUTERS. ABU ZUBAYDAH SAW HIM AGAIN RECENTLY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS AND BELIEVES THAT HE WAS EVACUATING AFGHANISTAN FOR IRAN. [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED]

--PRIOR TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS, HAWSAWI ASSISTED RAMZI ((BIN AL-SHIBH)) BY PROVIDING HIM U.S. \$1,500 TO TRAVEL TO DUBAI. ONCE IN DUBAI, ON 9 SEPTEMBER, AT KSM'S URGING, BIN AL-SHIBH ADVISED HAWSAWI, WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN TOLD THE MISSION WAS IMMINENT, TO LEAVE DUBAI IMMEDIATELY. KSM TOLD BOTH BIN AL-SHIBH AND HAWSAWI TO GO TO QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN AL-SHIBH ARRIVED IN QANDAHAR THE MORNING OF 11 SEPTEMBER. KSM WAS WAITING FOR BIN AL-SHIBH AT THE AIRPORT. HAWSAWI SOON ARRIVED AT THE SAME APARTMENT IN KARACHI AND INFORMED BIN AL-SHIBH THAT ON TELEVISION HE SAW A PLANE HIT A LARGE BUILDING. KSM SOON RETURNED TO THE APARTMENT AND TOGETHER BIN AL-SHIBH, HAWSAWI, AND KSM CELEBRATED THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED]

--BIN AL-SHIBH FURTHER NOTES THAT AS OF LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY 2002, KSM WAS ASSISTING HAWSAWI BY PROVIDING A SAFEHOUSE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO KEEP HAWSAWI SECURE. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] DURING THE MEETING, HAWSAWI AND BIN AL-SHIBH RECEIVED GREETINGS AND WORDS OF PRAISE FROM THE FOUR SENIOR AL-QA'IDA LEADERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF THE 19 AL-QA'IDA TERRORIST HIJACKERS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ABU HAFS AL-MASRI WAS KILLED IN COALITION AIRSTRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN IN NOVEMBER 2001.) PRIOR TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS, HAWSAWI FACILITATED COMMUNICATIONS AND THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS VIA HIS LOCATION IN DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, ON BEHALF OF MUHAMMAD 'ATTA AND THE OTHER 18 AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES INVOLVED IN THE 11 SEPTEMBER OPERATION. HAWSAWI, DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER PLOT BUT HE DID FACILITATE THE AIR, HOTEL, AND RENTAL CAR RESERVATIONS FOR 15 OF THE 19 OPERATIVES OVER A SIX MONTH PERIOD PRIOR TO 11 SEPTEMBER. [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct

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CIAAct

--ACCORDING TO KSM, HAWSAWI "DOES THINGS FOR THE BROTHERS." HE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT HAWSAWI IS "BLACK" AND CANNOT MOVE ABOUT EASILY IN PAKISTAN. IN ADDITION, KSM CLAIMED THAT HE VISITED HAWSAWI THE NIGHT OF THE ARREST ONLY BECAUSE OF A MEETING WITH ABU MUS'AB REGARDING A MONEY MAN "WHO CAME FROM YOUR SIDE." THIS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A REFERENCE TO [REDACTED]

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5. PLEASE USE SUGGESTED TEARLINES BELOW WITH AMMAR AND HAWSAWI.  
THANKS

-----TEARLINE-----

~~SECRET~~/ [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS FOR AMMAR

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

-----TEARLINE-----

6. BASE, PLEASE USE SUGGESTED TEARLINE BELOW FOR HAWSAWI.

-----TEARLINE-----

~~SECRET~~/ [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS FOR HAWSAWI

HAWSAWI HAS THUS FAR PROVIDED US WITH LITTLE INTEL ON THE HEATHROW PLOT OR ITS OPERATIVES. IN FACT, IN LATE MARCH 2003 HAWSAWI WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT FUNDS TRANSFERS AND/OR PAYMENTS MADE TO KSM'S OPERATIVES IN THE UK. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF FINANCIAL TRANSFERS AND/OR PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK AND ALSO CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF AL-QA'IDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UK INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS WITH THE NAMES ABU ADIL, ABU YOUSEF, OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER, KSM MENTIONED THAT HAWSAWI WOULD KNOW ABU ADIL, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT BELOW WILL PROVIDE SOME NEW LEADS. ADDITIONALLY, HAWSAWI HAS PROVIDED SOME INFORMATION ABOUT HIS ROLE IN AL-QA'IDA AS A FINANCE OFFICER AND LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KSM.

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END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

2019-385

Date:

TO: DIRECTOR, ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTS BY SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE AMMAR AL BALUCHI ON AL-QA'IDA  
MEMBER JAFFAR AL TAYYAR

(b)(1) ----- BODY -----

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TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ALEC INFO PRIORITY

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COUNTRY: ☐

SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTS BY SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE AMMAR AL BALUCHI  
ON AL-QA'IDA MEMBER JAFFAR AL TAYYAR

DOI: SEPTEMBER 2001 - MARCH 2003

SOURCE: A DETAINEE. (A DETAINEE)

SUMMARY: NONE

TEXT:

1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM DETAINEE ALI 'ABD AL-((AZIZ)) ALI, AKA AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)), MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM. AMMAR ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLDING INFORMATION AND EMPLOYING COUNTERINTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.)

2. DURING CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN MID-JULY 2003, AMMAR PROVIDED INFORMATION ON AL-QA'IDA MEMBER ((JAFAR AL-TAYYAR)). AMMAR SAID THAT HE FIRST MET JAFAR IN SEPTEMBER 2001 IN QANDAHAR AT THE MEDIA COMMITTEE GUESTHOUSE. HE DID NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY HOW HE MET HIM, JUST THAT HE WAS ONE OF THE BROTHERS AT THE GUESTHOUSE. HE DESCRIBED THEIR FRIENDSHIP AS A NORMAL FRIENDSHIP WHICH MEANS THAT THEIR FRIENDSHIP HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH OPERATIONS OR AL-QA'IDA. HE SAID THEY DISCUSSED COMPUTERS AND MEDIA, AS THEY WERE BOTH INTERESTED IN THESE THINGS. HE SAID THAT IN QANDAHAR THEY WERE NOT THAT CLOSE BUT THEY BECAME CLOSER IN JANUARY 2002 WHEN JAFAR CAME TO KARACHI. AMMAR OVERSAW SEVERAL HOUSES WHICH ACTED AS SAFEHOUSES FOR BROTHERS EVACUATING AFGHANISTAN, AND JAFAR WAS STAYING IN ONE OF THESE HOUSES. IT WAS AT IN KARACHI THAT AMMAR LEARNED THAT JAFAR HAD LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR A TIME.

3. IN THE FALL OF 2002 AMMAR HELD JAFAR'S LUGGAGE AND U.S. PASSPORT WHEN JAFAR WENT TO ISLAMABAD. THE LUGGAGE CONTAINED

PERSONAL ITEMS SUCH AS CLOTHING. ACCORDING TO AMMAR, THE REASON HE WAS HOLDING THESE ITEMS WAS SIMPLY THAT JAFAR PLANNED TO RETURN TO KARACHI AND DIDN'T WANT TO TAKE THESE THINGS WITH HIM TO ISLAMABAD. AMMAR RETURNED THE SUITCASE AND PASSPORT TO JAFAR IN JANUARY 2003. THIS WAS THE LAST TIME HE SAW JAFFAR.

4. AMMAR SAID THAT HE NEVER PROVIDED ANY FALSE DOCUMENTS TO JAFAR. JAFAR HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD A FRIEND IN LAHORE WHO COULD HELP HIM GET FALSE DOCUMENTS IF NECESSARY. AMMAR DID NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THIS FRIEND IN LAHORE.

5. AMMAR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK KHALID SHAYKH MOHAMMAD (KSM) INTENDED TO USE JAFAR IN ANY OPERATIONS, EVEN THOUGH JAFAR'S U.S. PASSPORT WOULD, ONE WOULD THINK, MAKE HIM A VALUABLE OPERATIVE. AMMAR SAID THIS WAS PROBABLY BECAUSE JAFFAR WAS NOT ESPECIALLY INTELLIGENT OR STRONG AND PERHAPS KSM DID NOT THINK HE WAS SUITABLE FOR ANYTHING EXCEPT THE MEDIA WORK WHICH HE WAS ALREADY DOING. AMMAR SAID THAT IF KSM HAD PLANNED TO USE JAFAR IN AN OPERATION, HE WOULD HAVE HAD AMMAR MAKE SOME ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM, SUCH AS OBTAINING FALSE DOCUMENTS OR MAKING TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, AND KSM HAD NEVER DONE SO. ALSO, JAFAR WOULD HAVE BEEN BUSY TRAINING AND PREPARING FOR THE OPERATION, IF HE WERE INVOLVED IN ONE, BUT INSTEAD JAFAR WAS IN KARACHI FOR A YEAR NOT DOING MUCH OF ANYTHING. AMMAR SAID THAT KSM KEPT THINGS COMPARTMENTED, SO IT WAS POSSIBLE HE HAD SOMETHING PLANNED FOR JAFAR AND DID NOT TELL AMMAR, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS THE CASE.

6. AMMAR SAID THAT JAFAR LEFT KARACHI AFTER KSM WAS ARRESTED, AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE HE WAS CURRENTLY LOCATED. HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANYONE WHO MIGHT KNOW WHERE JAFAR WAS, AS HE DID NOT THINK THAT JAFAR WAS ESPECIALLY CLOSE TO ANYONE. HE DID NOT THINK JAFAR WOULD GO TO THE TRIBAL AREAS AS JAFAR HAD ONCE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHERE THE U.S. WOULD EXPECT AL-QA'IDA MEMBERS TO GO. AMMAR SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS JAFAR WENT TO LAHORE, WHERE HE HAD A FRIEND.

7. AMMAR SAID THAT JAFAR HAD TAUGHT A TRAINING COURSE IN ELECTRONIC TIMERS TO FELLOW AL-QA'IDA MEMBERS MAJID KHAN AND MANSOUR KHAN IN KARACHI. KSM HAD ASKED MANSOUR TO BRING MAJID TO THE CLASS. AMMAR DID NOT THINK THERE WAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAJID KHAN AND JAFAR. JAFAR TAUGHT HIM THE COURSE AND THAT WAS PROBABLY THE EXTENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP. AMMAR POINTED OUT THAT THE COURSE WAS RATHER ROUTINE AND NOT GEARED TOWARDS A SPECIFIC OPERATION. MOREOVER, JUST BECAUSE JAFAR, MAJID AND MANSOUR WERE BROUGHT TOGETHER FOR THIS COURSE DID NOT MEAN THAT THEY WOULD NECESSARILY BE WORKING TOGETHER ON ANYTHING IN THE FUTURE.

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ACQ: (MID-JULY 2003).

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END OF MESSAGE

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Date: (b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
TO: [ ]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD COMMENTS ON OPERATIVES WORKING WITH AMMAR AL-BALUCHI WHO HAVE CONNECTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES AND [ ] POSSIBLE TARGETING OF SUSPENSION BRIDGES IN NEW YORK

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
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----- BODY -----

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TO: IMMEDIATE [ ]

INFO [ ]

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FOR: [ ]

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD COMMENTS OPERATIVES WORKING WITH AMMAR AL-BALUCHI WHO HAVE CONNECTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES AND [ ] POSSIBLE TARGETING OF SUSPENSION BRIDGES IN NEW YORK

REF: [ ] 10865 | [ ]  
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: 1) REQUEST ALEC/HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE IN PREPARING TEARLINE INFORMATION FOR DISSEMINATION IN INTEL CHANNELS, AS APPROPRIATE. 2) WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL, BETTER QUALITY



PHOTOGRAPHS OF MANSOUR ((MAQSOOD)) AND FAMILY FOR USE WITH KSM PER  
 BELOW. 3) PLEASE PROVIDE TEXTS OF SPECIFIC PHONE CALLS AND/OR EMAILS (b)(1)  
 FROM KHAN FAMILY IN U.S. TO PAKISTAN REGARDING ARREST OF KSM FOR USE (b)(3) CIAAct  
 IN FOLLOW-UP INTERROGATIONS, INCLUDING FROM TRUCK DRIVER BELOW. 4) (b)(3) NatSecAct  
 DEFER TO ALEC TO INCLUDE ANY ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION ON  
 SUBJECTS BELOW BASED ON SEPARATE REPORTING. [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] WELCOME FOLLOW-UP  
 REQUIREMENTS. (b)(3) CIAAct

2. BELOW IS BASED ON INTERROGATION OF KHALID SHAYKH  
 ((MUHAMMED)) AKA ((MUKHTAR)) CONDUCTED BY HVT INTERROGATORS [REDACTED] (b)(1)  
 [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ON 17 MARCH. DCOS/ALEC [REDACTED] SERVED AS (b)(3) CIAAct  
 ONSITE DEBRIEFER TO QUESTION SUBJECT. THE THREE HOUR SESSION FOCUSED (b)(3) NatSecAct  
 ENTIRELY ON THE MAJID ((KHAN)) NETWORK. MUKHTAR WAS INFORMED THAT WE  
 HAD STACKS AND STACKS OF EMAILS FROM HIM AND HIS NETWORK AND THAT WE  
 WERE GOING TO ASK HIM ABOUT IT AS A TEST OF HIS HONESTY. HE WAS TOLD  
 SPECIFICALLY THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN HIS NEPHEW AMMAR (b)(1)  
 AL-((BALUCHI)) AND A PERSON IN THAILAND. MUKHTAR THEN POSITIVELY (b)(3) CIAAct  
 IDENTIFIED THE PHOTOGRAPH OF MAJID KHAN AS ((MAJID)) AKA ((YUSIF)). (b)(3) NatSecAct  
 HE ALSO IDENTIFIED THE PHOTOGRAPH OF FARIS ((IYAM)) AS A "TRUCK  
 DRIVER" IN OHIO WHO IS A RELATIVE OF THE KHAN FAMILY AND WHOSE NAME  
 MUKHTAR DID NOT REMEMBER. HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OTHER PHOTOGRAPHS  
 BUT CLAIMED THAT THE PHOTOGRAPH OF MANSOUR ((MAQSOOD)) TAKEN FROM A  
 VIDEO STILL THAT WE SHOWED HIM WAS TOO GRAINY TO BE RECOGNIZEABLE.  
 WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL PHOTOS OF MANSOUR ET AL FOR USE WITH  
 KSM AS FOLLOW-UP.

-----TEAR LINE-----

(b)(1)  
 (b)(3) CIAAct  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct  
 (b)(5)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

-----TEAR LINE-----

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

182219Z MAR 03

10886

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct ~~TOP SECRET~~ 182214Z MAR 03

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

10886

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE

INFO

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD'S COMMENTS  
ON AL-QA'IDA ASSOCIATES TASKED WITH OPERATIONS IN THE  
UNITED STATES; DISCUSSION OF PLANS TO ATTACK GAS STATIONS,  
SUSPENSION BRIDGES, AND THE USE OF POISONS

REF: NONE

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

ACTION REQUIRED: 1) REQUEST ALEC/HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE IN  
PREPARING TEARLINE INFORMATION FOR DISSEMINATION IN INTEL CHANNELS,  
AS APPROPRIATE. 2) PLEASE RELAY BELOW [REDACTED] FOR USE IN  
QUESTIONING MAJID KHAN, ESPECIALLY REGARDING JAFAR AL-TAYYAR, TRUCK  
DRIVER IN OHIO, CONTACTS IN CALIFORNIA, AND POISONS PLOT PROPOSAL PER  
BELOW. PLEASE ALSO PROVIDE [REDACTED] WITH BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS  
ON JAFFAR FOR MAJID INTERROGATIONS

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. BELOW IS BASED ON INTERROGATION OF KHALID SHAYKH

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct (MUHAMMED)) (KSM) AKA ((MUKHTAR)) CONDUCTED BY HVT INTERROGATORS

[REDACTED] ON EVENING OF 18 MARCH. DCOS/ALEC

[REDACTED] SERVED AS ONSITE DEBRIEFER TO QUESTION SUBJECT. THE 90

MINUTE SESSION FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON REVELATIONS FROM MAJID ((KHAN))

THAT KSM HAD TASKED HIM WITH COLLECTING INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE

OPERATIONS AGAINST GAS STATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. HVT INTERROGATOR SET THE STAGE FOR THE MEETING BY TELLING KSM THAT WE HAVE MAJID IN CUSTODY AND THAT WE KNOW THERE IS MORE TO THE STORY OF KSM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MAJID THAN WHAT KSM HAD REPORTED. KSM RELUCTANTLY NODDED AFFIRMATIVELY AND WAS LEFT TO AWAIT

(b)(1) INTERROGATION TEAM. AS RELATED BELOW, KSM ADMITTED DETAILS THAT

(b)(3) CIAAct, ACK WELL WITH WHAT MAJID HAS REPORTED TO DATE, [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER,

THAT KSM'S VERSION OF EVENTS DIFFERS PRIMARILY IN THAT HE PORTRAYS MAJID AS QUITE THE EAGER YOUNG RECRUIT WHO WENT SO FAR AS TO PROPOSE OPERATIONS INSIDE THE U.S. WE NOTE ALSO THAT KSM STATED THAT SENIOR (b)(1)

OPERATIVE JAFAR AL-((TAYYAR)) ALSO MET MAJID AND EVEN PROVIDED HIM (b)(3) CIAAct

TRAINING. WE REQUEST THAT ALEC PROVIDE [REDACTED] WITH BACKGROUND AND (b)(3) NatSecAct

REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJID ON JAFFAR TO HELP US VET KSM'S STORY AS WE SUSPECT THAT THEIR JOINT "GAS STATION OPERATION" IS THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG FOR WHAT ALL AL-QA'IDA MAY HAVE HAD IN MIND.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

-----TEAR LINE-----

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)



(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

-----TEAR LINE-----

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date: (b)(3) CIAAct  
TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: ADDITIONAL KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD COMMENTS ON AL-QA'IDA ASSOCIATES TASKED WITH OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ 202101Z MAR 03 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

10910

TO: IMMEDIATE INFO

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR: (b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: ADDITIONAL KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD COMMENTS ON AL-QA'IDA ASSOCIATES TASKED WITH OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

REF: 10894 (b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: 1) REQUEST ALEC/HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE IN PREPARING TEARLINE INFORMATION FOR DISSEMINATION IN INTEL CHANNELS, AS APPROPRIATE. 2) PLEASE RELAY BELOW (b)(1) FOR USE IN QUESTIONING MAJID ((KHAN)).

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. BELOW IS BASED ON INTERROGATION OF KHALID SHAYKH

(b)(3) CIAAct

(MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) AKA ((MUKHTAR)) CONDUCTED BY HVT INTERROGATORS

AND ON 20 MARCH. DCOS/ALEC

SERVED AS ON-SITE DEBRIEFER TO QUESTION SUBJECT. THE SESSION FOCUSED  
ON PRESSING KSM TO REVIEW AND CLARIFY THE FACTS AS REPORTED IN

10886, GIVEN THAT PER REF, HE RETRACTED PART OF THE STORY ON

19 MARCH WHEN HE DISCLOSED THAT JAFFAR AL-((TAYYAR)) WAS NOT REALLY  
SLATED TO BE PART OF MAJID ((KHAN))'S PLAN IN THE US. KSM IS

STICKING TO OVERALL BOTTOM LINE, HOWEVER, AND SAYS THAT THE ONLY FACT

THAT IS NOT TRUE IS WHEN HE STATED, PER REF A, THAT HE ENVISIONED

THAT JAFFAR WOULD ULTIMATELY JOIN MAJID IN THE GAS STATION PLOT. KSM(b)(1)

ADMITTED THAT IN FACT HE IS RESERVING JAFFAR FOR A BIGGER ATTACK IN (b)(3) CIAAct

THE US AS STATED BELOW. AL-QA'IDA'S STRATEGY CALLS FOR BOTH SMALLER (b)(3) NatSecAct

AND BIGGER ATTACKS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION, KSM

ELABORATED ON THE ROLE OF TRUCK DRIVER FARIS ((IYAM)).

-----TEAR LINE-----

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct  
(b)(5)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~

-----TEAR LINE-----

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

TOP SECRET